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11. Introduction
Economic growth in Sub-Saharan Africa has been slow for decades (Easterly and Levine, 1997; 
Ndulu and O'Connell, 2007). According to data from the Penn World Table (Heston et al., 2009), 
Sub-Saharan African real income per capita grew at less than one percent over the past half century. 
In this paper we examine how and to what extent policy induced distortions to agricultural and non-
agricultural production are responsible for Sub-Saharan Africa's dismal growth performance. The 
average share of GDP from agriculture in the Sub-Saharan African countries during the past half 
century has been more than one-third (WDI, 2010). Even in recent years agricultural production in 
Sub-Saharan Africa has constituted about  a  quarter of total GDP and more than  half of total 
employment (Sandri, Valenzuela and Anderson, 2007). Given these large shares, the question of 
how much policy induced distortions to relative agricultural prices have slowed the region’s 
economic growth is economically relevant – both for the academic debate on the determinants of 
Africa's growth tragedy as well as for the policy debate on what works and does not work for 
stimulating economic growth in Sub-Saharan Africa.
Our estimation strategy to identify the causal effects that policy distortions to relative 
agricultural prices have on economic growth in Sub-Saharan African countries is based on a two-
step estimation approach. In the first step, we estimate the response of these policy distortions to 
economic growth, using plausibly exogenous variations in rainfall and international commodity 
price shocks as instrumental variables.
1 The instrumental variables approach enables us to examine 
how distortions to relative prices respond to exogenous changes in GDP per capita growth. 
Importantly,  beyond informing the political economy debate on the determinants of policy 
distortions, the results from this first step provide useful information on the extent to which these 
policy distortions are endogenous to changes in Sub-Saharan African countries' GDP per capita 
growth. In the second step, we use this information to estimate the effects that policy distortions 
1 We thus build on the prior literature that has shown that rainfall and international commodity price shocks have a 
significant effect on real GDP per capita growth of Sub-Saharan African countries. See for example Miguel et al. 
(2004), Barrios et al. (2010), or Brückner and Ciccone (2010, 2011).
2have on economic growth.  
Our first main finding is that there is no systematic response of relative agricultural price 
distortions to economic growth. Our instrumental variables regressions that control for country and 
year fixed effects yield a statistically insignificant effect of economic growth on relative agricultural 
price distortions. The estimated effects are also quantitatively small. They imply that a one percent 
higher GDP per capita growth decreased distortions to relative agricultural prices by at most 0.003 
standard deviations. We document that the effects of economic growth on agricultural policy 
distortions are insignificant and quantitatively small regardless of whether we use rainfall as an 
excluded instrument or international commodity price shocks. Furthermore, we show that the 
effects continue to be quantitatively small and statistically insignificant when we use a distributed 
lag model, exclude outliers, restrict the sample to the post-1985 period, or include additional within-
country controls that capture changes in the size of government, political institutions, and the 
incidence of civil war. Our first main finding therefore indicates that growth in average incomes 
does  not trigger significant changes in distortions to the  price  of  agricultural  relative to  non-
agricultural tradables. 
In the second part of the paper we examine the effects that these policy distortions have on 
economic growth. Our main finding there is that increases in policy distortions to relative 
agricultural prices have a statistically significant and quantitatively sizable negative effect on 
economic growth. Our panel fixed effects estimates yield that a one standard deviation increase in 
distortions to relative agricultural prices over the 1960-2005 period reduced real GDP per capita 
growth by about half a percentage point per annum on average. We document that this result is 
robust to allowing for country-specific growth effects, or using a distributed lag model to 
distinguish short-run from longer-run growth effects. We also document that there continues to be a 
significant negative and quantitatively sizable effect of relative agricultural price distortions on 
economic growth when we control for dynamics in GDP per capita growth using system-GMM 
3estimation.
There are a number of telling country episodes that fit the pattern documented by our panel 
fixed effects analysis. Tanzania, for example, halved its distortion to the relative price of farm 
products over the 1985-2005 period, during in which time income per capita increased by over 30 
percent.  By contrast,  over the same  period  Zimbabwe  increased  its  distortions  to relative 
agricultural prices by over 50 percent and experienced a drop in income per capita of more than 25 
percent. Other  less-extreme  examples  during the 1960-1980 period  include  Madagascar, which 
experienced an increase in relative agricultural price distortions of more than 50 percent when its 
real income per capita fell by more than 10 percent, and Uganda, which experienced a four-fold 
increase in relative agricultural price distortions and a decrease in real income per capita of over 25 
percent.
Over 85 percent of the partial equilibrium welfare cost of policy distortions to agricultural 
prices in Sub-Saharan African countries are due to restrictions on exports and imports (Croser and 
Anderson, 2011). Our paper is thus closely related to the empirical literature on the growth effects 
of policy distortions to international trade.
2  More generally, our paper is related to the large 
literature that has examined the link between trade openness and economic growth.
3 Our paper 
contributes to this literature in several ways. First, we use a new measure of trade distortions – 
relative price distortions to agriculture – that is of particular relevance in the context of estimating 
the growth effects in largely agrarian Sub-Saharan African countries. Second, we control in the 
panel regressions for country and year fixed effects, identifying the effects that distortions to trade 
have on economic growth from the within-country variation of the data. Third, we provide an 
2 See for example Edwards (1992) or Wacziarg and Welch (2008) for empirical evidence that policy distortions to 
international trade have significant negative growth effects. For historical evidence that trade policy distortions had 
a positive or insignificant effect on economic growth see, for example, O'Rouke (2000), Clemens and Williamson 
(2004), or Schularick and Solomou (2011).
3 See for example Sachs and Warner (1995), Frankel and Romer (1999), Alcala and Ciccone (2004), or Wacziarg and 
Welch (2008) for evidence of a positive effect of trade openness on economic growth. For a critique, see Rodriguez 
and Rodrik (2001). For empirical evidence that in Sub-Saharan Africa trade increases may have a negative effect on 
health (by increasing HIV), see Oster (2011). For empirical evidence that suggests that the positive effect of trade 
openness on economic growth is a more recent phenomenon of the later 20
th century, see Vamvakidis (2002).
4instrumental variables estimate of the response of agricultural policy distortions to economic 
growth, thereby informing the political economy debate on the extent to which trade and price 
policies are endogenous to economic growth. 
The remainder of our paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data. Section 3 
discusses the estimation strategy. Section 4 presents the main results. Section 5 concludes.
2. Data 
Relative Agricultural Price Distortions.  The World Bank recently completed a major global 
empirical study that estimated policy distortions to agricultural incentives since 1955.
4 The study 
estimates nominal rates of assistance (NRAs) to agricultural industries as well as nominal rates of 
assistance to nonagricultural tradables. The NRA is defined as the percentage by which government 
policies directly raise the gross return to producers of a product above what it would be without the 
government’s intervention (or lowered it, if NRA<0). This was estimated by comparing domestic 
and border prices of like products. To obtain the sectoral average NRA, the World Bank study’s 
contributors got the weighted average of product NRAs for enough farm products (an average of 8 
per country) to cover at least 70 percent of farm production valued at undistorted prices. 
Our main variable that captures policy induced distortions to relative agricultural prices is 
the relative rate of assistance (RRA). This variable is defined as:





t are the percentage NRAs for the tradables parts of the agricultural 
and non-agricultural sectors, respectively.
5  Since the NRA cannot be less than -100 percent  if 
producers are to earn anything, neither can the RRA (since the weighted average NRAnonag
t is 
non-negative in all the country case studies). And if both of those sectors are equally assisted, the 
4 The study is summarized in four regional volumes, including one on Africa (Anderson and Masters, 2009) and a 
global overview volume (Anderson 2009). The panel dataset of estimates of price distortions has been made freely 
available (Anderson and Valenzuela, 2008), and the methodology is documented in Anderson et al. (2008).
5 The NRAnonag
t is a weighted average of the trade taxes in the manufacturing and in the non-farm primary sectors, 
using sectoral shares  of  non-agricultural GDP  as weights. See  Anderson et al. (2008)  and the Appendices of 
Anderson and Masters (2009) for further details.  
5RRA is zero. 
Thus, economic policy reform that reduces sectoral bias is characterized by movements of 
the RRA towards zero from below (or from above, if a pro-agricultural policy bias had been in 
place). Note that the  RRA  takes into account that it  is  distortions to  relative prices that affect 
aggregate outcomes: farmers are affected not only by prices of their own products but also by prices 
faced by nonagricultural producers bidding from the same national pool of inter-sectorally mobile 
resources. More than seventy years ago Lerner (1936) provided his Symmetry Theorem to prove 
that, in a two-sector economy, an import tax has the same effects on production, consumption, trade 
and national economic welfare as an export tax. This carries over to a model that has many sectors, 
and is unaffected if there is imperfect competition domestically or internationally or if some of 
those sectors produce only nontradables (Vousden, pp. 46-47).
Figure 1 plots the time-series evolution of the RRA for each of the 14 large Sub-Saharan 
African countries in our sample (which accounts for more than three-quarters of the population of 
Sub-Saharan Africa excluding South Africa). An interesting stylized fact from Figure 1 is that, for 
the majority of those Sub-Saharan African countries, the RRA is negative. Hence on average there 
was a strong policy bias against agriculture over the past half-century. However, there is also 
substantial RRA variation across time and countries. For example, in Ethiopia, Madagascar, and 
Tanzania there was a continuous reduction in policy biases against agriculture, while in countries 
such as Zambia and Zimbabwe the strong bias against agriculture was firmly maintained. 
We note here that the RRA measure we use has several important advantages over other 
existing measures of policy distortions  available for Sub-Saharan African countries. First, the 
estimated nominal rates of assistance to agriculture and non-agriculture reported in Anderson and 
Valenzuela (2008) provide by far the longest and most consistent annual time-series data on policy 
distortions in Sub-Saharan African countries.
6 Second, measures of just trade policy distortions 
6  The only other study of this kind is by Krueger, Schiff and Valdés (1988), which covered three farm products for 
each of just three Sub-Saharan African countries over an average of 21 years: Cote d’Ivoire (1960-82), Ghana 
(1955-77) and Zambia (1966-84). A crude set of estimates of pre-1980 export tax equivalents for an average of two 
6typically use trade-weights to obtain sectoral averages, whereas the new World Bank study uses 
more-appropriate  weights based on  production  values at undistorted prices. Third,  most  other 
estimates of agricultural trade policy distortions focus on just import tariffs (see, e.g., WTO 2011), 
thereby missing export distortions (as well as occasional import subsidies) which turn out to have 
been far more important in Africa over the past half-century (see Croser and Anderson 2011). 
Commodity export price index. We construct a country-specific international commodity export 
price index for agricultural and natural resource commodities as:
where ComPricec,t is the international price of commodity c in year t, and θi,c is the average (time-
invariant) value of exports of commodity c in the GDP of country i.
7 We obtain data on annual 
international commodity prices from UNCTAD Commodity Statistics and our data on the value of 
commodity exports are from the NBER-United Nations Trade Database. The commodities included 
in the agricultural commodity export price index are beef, coffee, cocoa, cotton, maize, rice, rubber, 
sugar, tea, tobacco, wheat, and wood. The commodities included in the natural resource export price 
index are aluminum, copper, gold, iron, and oil. In case there were multiple prices listed for the 
same commodity a simple average of all the relevant prices is used. 
Rainfall. The annual rainfall data are monthly time series of terrestrial air temperature and precipit-
ation from 1900 to 2006 (Matsuura and Willmott, 2007). The rainfall data come at a high resolution 
(0.5°x0.5° latitude-longitude grid) and each rainfall observation in a given grid is constructed by in-
terpolation of rainfall observed by all stations operating in that grid. Rainfall data are then aggreg-
ated to the country level by assigning grids to the geographic borders of countries.
products in seven African countries is reported in Bates (1981, Appendix B). All other estimates known to the 
authors have smaller time series and are mostly single-country or single-commodity studies.
7 This functional form of the commodity export price index follows common practice in the literature. See for 
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qGDP per capita and other controls. Data on real per capita GDP are from the Penn World Table, 
version 6.3 (Heston et al., 2009). Data on political institutions are from the Polity IV database (Mar-
shall and Jaggers, 2009). The data on civil war incidence are from the PRIO/UPPSALA database on 
armed conflicts (CSCW, 2010). Data on the share of agricultural value added in GDP are from WDI 
(2010). For some summary statistics see Table 1.
3. Estimation Strategy
To examine the effects that within-country changes in distortions to relative agricultural prices 
(Δabs(rrai,t)) have on real GDP per capita growth (Δln(GDPi,t)), we estimate the following 
econometric model:
(1) Δln(GDPi,t) = αi + βt +  ηΔabs(rrai,t) +ΓXi,t+ ui,t 
where αi are country fixed effects that account for cross-country differences in geography, history, 
ethnicity and other time-invariant determinants of economic growth such as initial income per 
capita levels. The year fixed effects, βt, capture common year shocks that affect both GDP per 
capita growth in Africa and changes in agricultural product price distortions (for example, common 
shocks to economic growth that are due to changes in the world business-cycle or political events 
such as the end of the Cold War). The vector Xi,t includes additional within-country controls such as 
variations in a country-specific international export price index, rainfall, political institutions, and 
civil war incidence. Note that we use the change in the absolute rate of assistance because, as 
argued in Section 2, economic policy reform that reduces inter-sectoral bias is characterized by 
movements of the RRA towards zero (either from below if an anti-agricultural policy bias had been 
in place, or from above if a pro-agricultural policy bias had been in place). 
As a baseline regression, we estimate the average marginal effect η that within-country 
changes in relative agricultural price distortions have on economic growth. We then examine lagged 
8effects of these price distortions on economic growth by means of a distributed lag model where we 
include further lags of the relative rate of assistance on the right-hand side of the estimating 
equation. By doing so, we can examine both short-run and medium/long-run growth effects. For 
example, the short-run growth effects could differ from the longer-run growth effects if there are 
adjustment costs to capital so that it takes time for the capital stock in the sectors to fully adjust to 
the relative agricultural price distortions. 
It is possible that the growth effects of relative agricultural price distortions may be country-
specific. Country-specific growth effects could arise for example due to cross-country differences in 
sectoral compositions or due to cross-country differences in political economy factors that drive the 
relative agricultural price distortions. An important econometric issue, therefore, is whether the 
restricted form of equation (1) provides a consistent estimate of the average marginal effect of 
agricultural price distortions on economic growth in Africa. To check this, we use the mean-group 
estimator developed by Pesaran and Smith (1995). This estimator computes country-specific slope 
estimates and allows us to check whether the mean of these country-specific slope estimates is close 
to the estimate of the average marginal effect obtained in equation (1).
A further necessary condition for consistent estimation of the growth effects of agricultural 
price distortions is that our distortions variable is exogenous to within-country changes in economic 
growth. To examine whether this is the case, we use a two-stage least squares estimation approach 
that regresses the distortions variable on real GDP per capita growth which we instrument by 
within-country variations in rainfall and an international commodity export price index. We 
therefore make use of prior research by Miguel et al. (2004) and Brückner and Ciccone (2010, 
2011) that has used these instruments for economic growth in African countries to examine how 
growth shocks affect civil war risk and within-country variations in political institutions. The 
exclusion restriction in this two-stage least squares estimation is that, conditional on economic 
growth, year-to-year variations in rainfall and international commodity prices only affect relative 
9agricultural price distortions through their income per capita effects. We examine this exclusion 
restriction in detail in the section that follows.
4. Results 
4.1 The response of relative agricultural price distortions to economic growth
We begin our empirical analysis by estimating the response of agricultural policy distortions to 
within-country changes in real GDP per capita. This first-step exercise serves the purpose of 
clarifying whether indeed our policy distortions variable – the change in the absolute value of the 
relative rate of assistance – is exogenous to economic growth. Our first-step exercise also sheds 
light on the question of how and to what extent plausibly exogenous growth shocks affect the 
political process of setting relative price distortions in the economy.
Table 2 presents our instrumental variables estimates of the effect that economic growth has 
on the RRA. Column (1) reports country and year fixed effects estimates where we instrument the 
within-country change in real GDP per capita with the within-country change in rainfall and the 
within-country change in the international commodity export price index. The main result in Panel 
A is that the estimated coefficient on real GDP per capita growth is statistically insignificant and 
quantitatively small. The estimated coefficient implies that at most a one standard deviation change 
in real GDP per capita growth leads to a 0.02 standard deviation change in the absolute value of the 
RRA. 
To ensure that the insignificant coefficient on GDP per capita growth is not driven by 
outliers, we report in column (2) instrumental variable estimates that exclude the top/bottom 1 
percentile of GDP per capita growth. In this case the obtained estimates are also quantitatively small 
and statistically insignificant. In column (3) we show that similar results are obtained if we restrict 
the sample to the post-1985 period (thus excluding events such as the oil price shock of the 1970s 
and the upward trend in the relative rate of assistance that began to occur during the pre-1985 
10period); and in column (4) we show that there is also no significant effect of economic growth on 
the RRA when including on the right-hand side of the estimating equation additional within-country 
control variables such as the government expenditures share, the polity2 score, and an indicator 
variable for the incidence of civil war.
8 Hence, the main result of these instrumental variables 
estimates is that on impact there is no systematic response of the RRA to economic growth. 
For comparison purposes with the instrumental variables estimates, we report least-squares 
estimates in Appendix Table 1. The least squares estimates are negative in sign but statistically 
insignificant. We note that if policy distortions to relative agricultural prices have a negative effect 
on economic growth, reverse causality bias implies that the least-squares estimates are biased 
downward. This downward bias can explain why the least-squares estimate on the impact response 
of the RRA to economic growth is negative. The negative reverse causality bias can also explain 
why in absolute size, the least squares coefficient is larger than the coefficient that is obtained from 
the instrumental variables regression. 
We note that the quality of our instrumental variables is reasonable. Panel B of Table 2 
reports the first-stage estimates, which are individually highly statistically significant. The joint 
first-stage F-statistic is well above 10. Given this first-stage F-statistic we can reject at the 5 percent 
significance level, based on the tabulations reported in Stock and Yogo (2005), that the maximal IV 
relative bias is larger than 5 percent. Bias due to weak instruments is therefore unlikely to be an 
issue in our instrumental variables regressions. Moreover, the validity of our instruments in terms of 
being uncorrelated with the second-stage error term cannot be rejected. The Hansen J test produces 
an insignificant p-value on the joint hypothesis that our instruments are uncorrelated with the 
second-stage  error   term.   This   is   a  first   reassuring   indication   that  our  instruments  do  not 
systematically violate the exclusion restriction.
8 Research by Miguel et al. (2004) and Brückner and Ciccone (2010, 2011) has shown that rainfall and international 
commodity price shocks have a significant effect on civil war and political institutions. Reporting results that control 
for within-country changes in the incidence of civil war and political institutions is therefore an important robustness 
check. 
11In Table 3 we show that there are no significant reduced form effects. Changes in neither the 
agricultural commodity price index nor the natural resource commodity price index are significantly 
correlated with changes in the absolute value of the RRA. We also do not find a significant reduced 
form effect of year-to-year variations in rainfall. This is true regardless of whether we consider the 
largest possible Sub-Saharan African sample (column (1)); exclude observations in the top/bottom 1 
percentile of GDP per capita growth (column (2)); exclude the pre-1985 period (column (3)); or 
include additional within-country control variables on the right-hand side of the regression (column 
(4)). Hence, despite Panel B of Table 2 showing that international commodity price shocks and 
rainfall shocks have a highly significant effect on GDP per capita growth of Sub-Saharan African 
countries, Table 3 shows that there are no significant reduced-form effects. The reduced-form 
estimates in Table 3 therefore echo the insignificant instrumental variables estimates, reported in 
Panel A of Table 2, which show that there is no significant impact response of the RRA to plausibly 
exogenous variations in real GDP per capita growth.
A more intuitive way to demonstrate that rainfall and international commodity price shocks 
are valid instruments is to report the effects that rainfall and international commodity price shocks 
have on the RRA conditional on GDP per capita growth. In Panel A of Table 4 we report estimates 
for instrumenting GDP per capita growth with the change in the international commodity export 
price index and including rainfall on the right-hand side of the second-stage equation. In Panel B of 
Table 4 we report estimates for instrumenting GDP per capita growth with the change in rainfall 
and including the international commodity export price index on the right-hand side of the second-
stage equation. Both panels show that, conditional on GDP per capita growth, rainfall and 
international commodity price shocks do not have significant effects on the RRA. Hence, when 
conditioning on GDP per capita we find that there are no significant effects of rainfall and 
international commodity price shocks on the relative rate of assistance.  This more intuitive 
examination of the exclusion restriction therefore reconfirms the results of the Hansen J test that 
12showed that there is no systematic evidence of the instruments being correlated with the second-
stage error term.
A further issue in the estimation of the effects that economic growth has on policy 
distortions to the relative price between agricultural and non-agricultural products is whether there 
are significant lagged effects. Recall that Table 2 reports the contemporaneous response of the RRA 
to economic growth. The sample autocorrelation of economic growth is fairly low (0.1) and hence 
examining the contemporaneous effect that economic growth has on the RRA without controlling 
for additional lags of economic growth is unlikely to lead to inconsistent estimates of the impact 
effect. To show that this is indeed the case, Table 5 reports estimates from a distributed lag model 
that include up to two additional lags of GDP per capita growth on the right-hand side of the 
estimating equation. The main result is that in these augmented regressions the contemporaneous 
effect of economic growth on the RRA continues to be quantitatively small and statistically 
insignificant. Note also that the lagged effects of economic growth are insignificant for most of the 
specifications.
9 
To summarize, the main message of our instrumental variables regressions is that the impact 
and lagged effects of the change in the absolute value of the RRA are exogenous to within-country 
variations in GDP per capita growth.  This is an important result because it implies that the 
necessary condition of exogeneity is satisfied in the following part of our empirical analysis where 
we examine the effects that changes in the absolute RRA have on economic growth. 
4.2 The effects of relative agricultural price distortions on economic growth
Table 6 reports the least-squares estimates of the impact effect that changes in the absolute value of 
the relative rate of assistance have on economic growth. The results for the largest possible sample 
are in column (1). The estimated coefficient on the RRA is -0.04 and this estimate is significant at 
9 We have also explored the effects of further lags of GDP growth at t-3 and t-4. The estimates on these lags turned 
out to be insignificant and quantitatively small. 
13the 10 percent level. Quantitatively, the estimate implies that on average a one standard deviation 
increase in the absolute RRA is associated with a lower GDP per capita growth rate of about 0.6 
percentage points. In column (2) we show that the precision of our estimates improves somewhat 
when we exclude potential outliers. Excluding observations that fall in the top/bottom 1 percentile 
of the GDP per capita growth distribution yields an estimated coefficient of -0.03. This coefficient 
is statistically significant at the 1 percent level. When we exclude the pre-1985 period the effect of 
relative agricultural price distortions on economic growth becomes quantitatively larger (column 
(3)). However, the smaller sample size also leads to a substantial increase in the standard error so 
that we cannot reject that the estimated effect in column (3) is significantly different from the 
estimated effect in column (1). In column (4) we show that results are quantitatively similar to our 
baseline estimates if we include additional within-country control variables such as the government 
expenditure share, the polity2 score, and an indicator variable for the incidence of civil war. 
An important econometric issue is whether our results are robust to allowing for country-
specific growth effects of policy distortions to relative agricultural prices. It is well known from the 
panel data literature that if the country-specific slope estimates are correlated with the error term 
this produces inconsistent estimates in the restricted panel data model of the average marginal 
effect. To check whether cross-country parameter heterogeneity leads to inconsistent estimates of 
the average marginal effect in our sample, we use the mean-group estimator developed by Pesaran 
and Smith (1995) that allows for country-specific coefficients. We report the results of this 
regression graphically in Figure 2, where we provide a kernel density plot of the distribution of the 
country-specific slope estimates. The mean (median) of this kernel density plot is -0.04 (-0.03). 
Therefore, cross-country parameter heterogeneity does not lead to a significant bias of the average 
marginal effect in our sample. 
An interesting question is whether beyond the significant negative impact effect of price 
distortions on economic growth there is also a significant negative lagged effect. Such a lagged 
14effect could arise if, for example, there are significant adjustment costs to capital that differ across 
sectors in the economy. Our panel data set has a fairly large T dimension (the average T is about 35) 
and, therefore, is well suited to explore lagged effects of within-country changes in policy 
distortions to relative agricultural prices on economic growth. In fact, we would like to restate here 
that a key advantage of using annual panel data is that this allows us to examine not only short-run 
growth effects, which are of substantial interest in and of themselves, but also medium/long-run 
growth effects by means of a distributed lag model.
In Table 7 we report dynamic panel data estimates as a first approximation to characterize 
the medium/long-run effect of relative agricultural price distortions on economic growth. We report 
system-GMM estimates (Blundell and Bond, 1998) as well as least-squares estimates. The presence 
of country fixed effects leads to inconsistent least-squares estimates in the dynamic panel 
regression. However, in our regressions this bias should be relatively small since the average T is 
fairly large. Panel A of Table 7 shows that the dynamic panel data regression produces a coefficient 
on lagged GDP per capita growth of about 0.05 to 0.1. A test for second-order serial correlation 
produces always insignificant results. Thus, specification tests indicate that the model is well 
specified. We compute the long-run growth response from the dynamic panel data model by 
inverting the characteristic polynomial. This yields a cumulative (long-run) growth effect of a 
permanent increase in relative agricultural price distortions of about -0.05. This estimate is very 
similar to the static panel data model where we concentrate on the impact growth effect of relative 
agricultural price distortions. Panel B of Table 7 shows that very similar results are obtained if we 
use the fixed effects least squares estimator instead of the system-GMM estimator. 
Another way to examine short-run and  longer-run growth effects is by means of a 
distributed lag model. In Table 8 we show the results for the case of including in addition to the 
year t effect the year t-1 and t-2 effect of within-country changes in the absolute RRA. The least-
squares estimates on the lagged effects are negative in sign, but statistically insignificant and 
15quantitatively much smaller in absolute size than the estimated impact effect for most of the 
specifications. Moreover, these regressions show that including additional lags of the RRA on the 
right-hand side of the estimating equation changes little the coefficient on the contemporaneous 
effect of policy distortions on economic growth. 
The main conclusion from our panel fixed effects estimates is thus that increases in 
distortions to relative agricultural prices have a significant negative effect on economic growth in 
Sub-Saharan African countries. For welfare purposes, it is also of interest to examine whether these 
distortions had a significant negative effect on private consumption. In Table 9 we therefore report 
panel fixed effects estimates of the effect that changes in the relative rate of assistance had on real 
consumption per capita. Our main finding is a significant negative effect. Both the impact and 
lagged effects of changes in relative agricultural price distortions on consumption are negative. This 
is true regardless of whether we consider the largest possible Sub-Saharan African sample (column 
(1)); exclude outliers (column (2)); exclude the pre-1985 period (column (3)); or include additional 
within-country control variables on the right-hand side of the regression (column (4)). Hence, Table 
9 reinforces the earlier finding that increases in the absolute RRA led to a significant decrease in 
economic well-being in Sub-Saharan Africa.
5. Conclusion
In the 1960s and 1970s, farm output in Sub-Saharan African countries was subject to very heavy 
export taxation, but since then the disincentives facing farmers have been reduced, albeit much less 
rapidly than in other developing countries (Anderson, 2009). The dismal growth performance of 
Sub-Saharan Africa's agrarian economies provides an important case study for exploring how much 
distortions to agricultural incentives have slowed economic growth. 
We  have  addressed  this  issue  empirically using rigorous panel fixed effects estimation 
techniques. Our fixed effects analysis yielded that, during the period 1960 to 2005, a one standard 
16deviation increase in distortions to relative agricultural prices decreased real GDP per capita growth 
by about half a percentage point per annum on average. Our empirical results thus suggest that the 
anti-agricultural policy  bias  contributed significantly to Sub-Saharan Africa's dismal growth 
performance over the past half century. 
Our findings are important for several reasons. First, they imply that reducing distortions to 
incentives faced by even the world’s poorest farmers can be growth-enhancing. Our findings thus 
do not support the view that there are significant growth benefits associated with subsidizing 
manufacturing and other sectors at the expense of agriculture. Second, our findings suggest that the 
returns from investments in agricultural development will be greater in countries with less distorted 
relative prices.  Funding for agricultural development in Sub-Saharan Africa is expanding rapidly at 
present, particularly via development assistance programs.
10  Our findings provide additional 
empirical support to those arguing that aid flows would be more effective if those numerous African 
countries that still have an anti-agricultural policy bias (see Figure 1) were to reduce it. Third, our 
empirical analysis shows that there is a significant within-country effect of policy distortions on 
economic growth. This is an important result because it implies that the relationship between price 
distortions and economic growth is unlikely to be a consequence of the strong ethnic divisions that 
characterize many Sub-Saharan African countries. The reason is that ethnic divisions, as measured 
by countries' ethnic fractionalization or polarization, are mostly time-invariant variables. Hence, 
these variables cannot be a cause of within-country variations in  price  distortions. From an 
economic policy viewpoint, our findings of a significant within-country effect of price distortions 
on economic growth is therefore important because it suggests that in African countries there are 
significant factors that influence economic growth beyond ethnic divisions.
10  See, for example, the wide range of major donor partners that have joined with the Alliance for a Green Revolution 
for Africa, at  www.agra-alliance.org/section/links and the Partnership to Cut Hunger and Poverty in Africa, at 
www.partnership-africa.org,   as   well   as   the   contribution   from   the   Bill   and   Merlinda   Gates   foundation   at 
www.gatesfoundation.org/agriculturaldevelopment/Pages/default.aspx. 
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21Table 1. Descriptive Statistics
Mean Stdv. Observations
Real GDP Per Capita 1637.1 713.0 532
Real GDP Per Capita Growth  0.004 0.078 532
Abs. Relative Rate of Assistance  0.372 0.225 532
Change Abs. Relative Rate of Assistance  -0.004 0.148 532
Share of Agricultural Value Added 0.342 0.139 400
Growth Rate of Agricultural Value Added -0.005 0.120 400
Polity2 Score 0.685 7.498 394
Civil War Incidence 0.058 0.233 532
22Table 2. The Effects of Economic Growth on the Relative Rate of Assistance
(2SLS Estimates)
     




















Hansen J, p-value 0.15 0.60 0.19 0.48
First-Stage, F-Statistic 18.45 14.55 149.46 11.29
Country Fe Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fe Yes Yes Yes Yes

























Country Fe Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fe Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 532 522 280 390
Countries 14 14 14 12
Note: The dependent variable in Panel A is the change in the absolute relative rate of assistance; Panel B the change in the log of real GDP per capita. 
The method of estimation is two-stage least squares. Huber robust standard errors (shown in parentheses) are clustered at the country level. Column 
(2) excludes observations of the top and bottom 1 percentile of the real GDP per capita growth distribution. Column (3) excludes observations for the 
pre-1985 period. Column (4) adds the within-country change of the government expenditures share, the polity2 score, and an indicator variable for the 
incidence of civil war.  *Significantly different from zero at the 10 percent significance level, ** 5 percent significance level, *** 1 percent 
significance level.
23Table 3. The Reduced-Form Effects of International Commodity Price Shocks and Rainfall Shocks 
on the Relative Rate of Assistance
(Reduced Form)
Δabs(RRA)



































Country Fe Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fe Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 532 522 280 390
Countries 14 14 14 12
Note: The dependent variable is the change in the absolute relative rate of assistance. The method of estimation is least-squares. Huber robust 
standard errors (shown in parentheses) are clustered at the country level. Column (2) excludes observations of the top and bottom 1 percentile of the 
real GDP per capita growth distribution. Column (3) excludes observations for the pre-1985 period. Column (4) adds the within-country change of the 
government expenditures share,the polity2 score, and an indicator variable for the incidence of civil war. *Significantly different from zero at the 10 
percent significance level, ** 5 percent significance level, *** 1 percent significance level.
24Table 4. The Effects of Economic Growth on the Relative Rate of Assistance
(2SLS Estimates; Additional Tests of Exclusion Restriction)
Δabs(RRA)
     




























First-Stage, F-Statistic 11.41 7.97 164.13 10.96
Country Fe Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fe Yes Yes Yes Yes

























First-Stage, F-Statistic 8.14 8.87 12.26 2.97
Country Fe Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fe Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 532 522 280 390
Countries 14 14 14 12
Note: The dependent variable is the change in the absolute relative rate of assistance. The method of estimation is two-stage least squares. Huber 
robust standard errors (shown in parentheses) are clustered at the country level. Column (2) excludes observations of the top and bottom 1 percentile 
of the real GDP per capita growth distribution. Column (3) excludes observations for the pre-1985 period. Column (4) adds the within-country change 
of the government expenditures share, the polity2 score, and an indicator variable for the incidence of civil war. *Significantly different from zero at 
the 10 percent significance level, ** 5 percent significance level, *** 1 percent significance level.
25Table 5. The Effects of Economic Growth on the Relative Rate of Assistance
(2SLS Estimates; Distributed Lag Estimates)
Δabs(RRA)



































First-Stage F-statistic 9.69 5.44 137.75 14.03
Hansen J, p-value 0.24 0.35 0.28 0.40
Country Fe Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fe Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 502 522 280 390
Countries 14 14 14 12
Note: The dependent variable is the change in the absolute relative rate of assistance. The method of estimation is two-stage least squares. The 
instrumental variables are rainfall and the international commodity export price indices. Huber robust standard errors (shown in parentheses) are 
clustered at the country level. Column (2) excludes observations of the top and bottom 1 percentile of the real GDP per capita growth distribution. 
Column (3) excludes observations for the pre-1985 period. Column (4) adds the within-country change of the government expenditures share, the 
polity2 score, and an indicator variable for the incidence of civil war. *Significantly different from zero at the 10 percent significance level, ** 5 
percent significance level, *** 1 percent significance level.





















Country Fe Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fe Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 532 522 280 390
Countries 14 14 14 12
Note: The dependent variable is real GDP per capita growth. The method of estimation is least squares. Huber robust standard errors (shown in 
parentheses) are clustered at the country level. Column (2) excludes observations of the top and bottom 1 percentile of the real GDP per capita growth 
distribution. Column (3) excludes observations for the pre-1985 period. Column (4) adds the within-country change of the government expenditures 
share,the polity2 score, and an indicator variable for the incidence of civil war. *Significantly different from zero at the 10  percent significance level, 
** 5 percent significance level, *** 1 percent significance level.
27Table 7. The Effects of Changes in the Relative Rate of Assistance on Economic Growth






























AR (1) Test, p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
AR (2) Test, p-value 0.20 0.44 0.38 0.14
Country Fe Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fe Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 531 521 280 389




























Country Fe Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fe Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 531 521 280 389
Countries 14 14 14 12
Note: The dependent variable is real GDP per capita growth. The method of estimation in Panel A is system-GMM. In Panel B the method of 
estimation is least squares. Huber robust standard errors (shown in parentheses) are clustered at the country level. Column (2) excludes observations 
of the top and bottom 1 percentile of the real GDP per capita growth distribution. Column (3) excludes observations for the pre-1985 period. Column 
(4) adds the within-country change of the government expenditures share,the polity2 score, and an indicator variable for the incidence of civil war. 
*Significantly different from zero at the 10  percent significance level, ** 5 percent significance level, *** 1 percent significance level.














































Country Fe Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fe Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 517 502 280 382
Countries 14 14 14 12
Note: The dependent variable is the change in the log of real GDP per capita. The method of estimation is least squares. Huber robust standard errors  
(shown in parentheses) are clustered at the country level. Column (2) excludes observations of the top and bottom 1 percentile of the real GDP per 
capita growth distribution. Column (3) excludes observations for the pre-1985 period. Column (4) adds the within-country change of the government 
expenditures share,the polity2 score, and an indicator variable for the incidence of civil war. *Significantly different from zero at the 10 percent 
significance level, ** 5 percent significance level, *** 1 percent significance level.













































Country Fe Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fe Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 517 502 280 382
Countries 14 14 14 12
Note: The dependent variable is the change in the log of real consumption per capita. The method of estimation is least squares. Huber robust standard 
errors (shown in parentheses) are clustered at the country level. Column (2) excludes observations of the top and bottom 1 percentile of the real GDP 
per capita growth distribution. Column (3) excludes observations for the pre-1985 period. Column (4) adds the within-country change of the 
government expenditures share,the polity2 score, and an indicator variable for the incidence of civil war. *Significantly different from zero at the 10 
percent significance level, ** 5 percent significance level, *** 1 percent significance level.
30Appendix Table 1. Least Squares Estimates of the Effects of Economic Growth on the Relative Rate 
of Assistance
Δabs(RRA)



















Country Fe Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fe Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 532 522 280 390
Countries 14 14 14 12
Note: The dependent variable is the change in the absolute relative rate of assistance. The method of estimation is least-squares. Huber robust 
standard errors (shown in parentheses) are clustered at the country level. Column (2) excludes observations of the top and bottom 1 percentile of the 
real GDP per capita growth distribution. Column (3) excludes observations for the pre-1985 period. Column (4) adds the within-country change of the 
government expenditures share, the polity2 score, and an indicator variable for the incidence of civil war. *Significantly different from zero at the 10 
percent significance level, ** 5 percent significance level, *** 1 percent significance level.
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Zambia ZimbabweFigure 2. Distribution of Country-Specific Slope Estimates
Note: The figure shows the kernel density plot of the country-specific slopes estimates that are obtained from a panel fixed 
effects regression where the dependent variable is the change of the log of real GDP per capita and the explanatory variable 
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